Wednesday, March 31, 2004

 

Pepys' Diary

For those so disposed, the Diary of Samuel Pepys is available online as a blog. Pepys (pronounced "peeps") lived in London in the mid seventeenth century and kept a diary which survives as a daily record of life in the period and for those interested in language, Pepys' use of English is often interesting. There are a lot of links to explanations of words and names in the text and if you are not watchful, hours can pass unnoticed. An example of interest: Pepys had a kidney stone removed by surgery and we are given a description of the surgeon's work and the reason Pepys often gave thanks for his surviving the procedure. I guess one would if one had had it like he had it. The site gives Pepys diary for the current day. Check it out.

Sunday, March 14, 2004

 

The Psychology of Geeks

My travels took me to this strange strand. I found myself learning a lot, not just about programmers and the MBTI but about project management, balancing career and family, and other factors of personal and corporate success. I am surprised though, that the author could write the article without reference to "Office Space", a film also plumbing the depths of the psyches of programmers.

 

Railroad Security

Phil Carter has a good treatment of the security picture on rail travel in the light of recent attacks. I recall the quote from some smart general, "Hit 'em where they ain't". Few are observing this obvious common element about the behavior of those making terrorist attacks. They find weak places and attack them. They are few and weak themselves. Attacking positions of strength makes no sense. Geurillas have been exploiting the weaknesses of their enemies for thousands of years. They force the enemy to funnel resources to the point of the last attack, then plan another attack, not on the newly fortified place, but on a newly selected point of weakness.


quote: "Relative to passenger air travel, air cargo and rail transportation are thus compartively unprotected. They are "soft" targets in force protection parlance. The conventional wisdom in AT/FP planning is that the more you protect the hard targets (i.e. airports), the more likely you make an attack on a soft target (i.e. train station). That has been the inherent risk of America's homeland security strategy since 9/11, and the attacks in Spain bring home just how risky this strategy has been."


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